A few weeks ago, a ceasefire between the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (P.K.K.) terrorist organization and the Republic of Türkiye was achieved. Then, just this week, another announcement was made: the Syrian Democratic Forces (S.D.F.), a Kurdish military faction, will join the new Syrian government. Between these two announcements, the possibility of an independent Kurdish state has become even more of an open question.

The ceasefire between Türkiye and the P.K.K. occurred after imprisoned Kurdish leader Abdullah Öcalan called for the organization to disband itself. The ceasefire is almost certainly a setback for Kurdish national aspirations and a victory for Türkiye. A Kurdish state would almost certainly incorporate land currently within the borders of Türkiye, an obviously unacceptable proposition for nationalist Turkish President Recep Erdogan. Over the past several decades, the country has opposed the Kurdish independence movement in rhetoric and military action, both within its own borders and along its border with Syria.

The effect of the S.D.F.’s incorporation into the new Syrian government, on the other hand, is more complicated and more difficult to predict. Yet regardless of the results of the incorporation of the S.D.F., the broader Kurdish independence movement is unlikely to collapse. The movement, which is more than 100 years old, consists of multiple loosely affiliated organizations in several predominantly post-Ottoman countries.

That’s not a typo: the independence movement is really 100 years old.

A 100 Year Movement

In 1918, the Peace of Paris ended the First World War and radically changed the world order. The peace process is infamous for its many failures, one of which was the creation of the League of Nations, the predecessor to the U.N. Although the League is best known for its ineffectual nature, it also played a major role in managing the Ottoman Empire’s ruinous dissolution.

The League of Nations put much of the former Ottoman Empire into Class A Mandates, as part of its infamous Mandate System. The Class A Mandates were nominally intended to provide support for territories as an interstitial step between being members of the Ottoman Empire and achieving full statehood. This didn’t exactly pan out for... a whole bunch of reasons. (Given that the language the League used to justify the Mandate System is reminiscent of Ruyard Kipling’s “The White Man’s Burden” poem, it’s just ever-so-possible that colonialism may have played a role.)

In the specific case of Kurdish independence, however, the big issue was not with the Mandates themselves, but with how they were instituted. The League failed to fully think through the national identities of the people living in the newly divided territories. The Kurdish people, a major ethnic group in the region, were resultantly split across the Syrian and Iraqi mandates, as well as the newly formed country of Turkey (now Türkiye), all of which had formerly been part of the Ottoman Empire. Without land designated for them to one day call their own, a Kurdish independence movement began to develop.

The movement quickly developed a poor track record of negotiating with surrounding countries, so it is unsurprising that it soon turned to warfare to achieve its goals. Rather than fighting with conventional means, many organizations supporting Kurdish independence resorted to guerrilla attacks launched from mountainous terrain. These organizations were resultingly (and accurately) branded as terroristic. Yet it seems improbable that the movement, which has been enormously successful at taking on far larger, conventional military forces, would have been able to survive without such practices.

Nevertheless, it is unsurprising that both violent and nonviolent parts of the Kurdish independence movement have catalyzed harsh reactions from countries with large Kurdish populations. What is concerning, however, is that these reactions rarely target militants alone. In Syria, many Kurdish people were stripped of their citizenship and rendered stateless. Perhaps most notoriously, the former Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein oversaw the Anfal Campaign, which saw the poison gas and other chemical weapons deployed against Kurdish population centers. Human rights organizations have since copiously documented the Anfal Campaign and designated it a genocide.

The Kurdish independence movement has not yet achieved its aspirations. But despite decades of oppression, Kurdish nationalism is still thriving. This enduring national sentiment has been to the chagrin of regional political leaders, and although Mr. Hussein is an outlier in the extremity of his approach to Kurdish people, he is not alone in repressing them.

Fall of the P.K.K.

Under President Erdogan, Türkiye has worked to de facto criminalize expressions of Kurdish nationalism. The Turkish government works to associate peaceful protesters expressing support for Kurdish rights with the militant P.K.K., and subsequently arrests them.

With the Turkish-P.K.K. ceasefire, Türkiye may be deprived of a useful organization to associate peaceful Kurdish separatists with in order to delegitamize them. On the other hand, the increased domestic security is probably a worthwhile tradeoff in the eyes of President Erdogan.

The long-term impact for Türkiye’s domestic Kurdish population is not completely clear. Without the P.K.K. to contend with, Mr. Erdogan’s government may turn its attention to other matters. On the other hand, it is possible that the ceasefire will prove ephemeral and that fighting will resume within a few months or years.

Integration of the S.D.F.

On the other hand, while Türkiye may have weakened its domestic Kurdish independence movement, the incorporation of the S.D.F. into the new Syrian government seems likely to strengthen Syria’s. It is a distinct possibility that the incorporation of the S.D.F. heralds a semi-autonomous Kurdish government being instituted in northern Syria, similar to the situation in post-Hussein Iraq. A semi-autonomous region could even lay the groundwork for the establishment of a fully sovereign Kurdish state.

This possibility, however, is not guaranteed to come to pass. A potential semi-autonomous zone would almost certainly be on the Turkish border, likely upsetting Ankara. And even if a semi-autonomous Kurdish-controlled region did develop, there’s no guarantee it would last. Similar semi-autonomous Kurdish regions have often collapsed quickly; there’s a very good chance that another attempt wouldn’t last more than a few years.

Syrian Motivations

It is interesting that the new Syrian government has chosen to integrate the S.D.F., in both civil and military regards. My suspicion is that there are three key reasons which drove this decision.

First and foremost, the Syrian government is probably aiming to reduce the number of remaining factions in the country now that Mr. Assad has been removed from power. If all of, or most of, the anti-Assad rebel groups are able to work together, Syria has a real shot at achieving peace after a decade of war.

Second, the S.D.F. controls many of Syria’s oil and gas fields; having access to the associated revenues and the broader economic benefits will seriously strengthen Syria’s new government’s economic legitimacy.

Third, the moves seem intended to project an image of the new government as pluralistic. The integration of the S.D.F. came shortly before a similar deal was made with the Druze ethnic minority group. Not only do these moves seem intended to convince those concerned that the new Islamic leadership will prove intolerant of other identities, but they seem almost aimed at one specific observer: Israel.

Israel has previously provided military support to the S.D.F., and is a long-time supporter of the Kurdish independence movement. Similarly, the Druze minority community is small within Israel, but it is politically significant.

Israel has acted quite aggressively towards Syria since the fall of Mr. Assad’s regime. Since the Assad regime fell, Israel has captured land in the Golan Heights and bombed Syrian military facilities. If Syria is able to assuage Israeli fears, even while losing the remainder of the Golan Heights, it may ensure its new government can escape the wrath of its more powerful neighbor to the south.

Conclusions

With the ceasefire between Türkiye and the P.K.K., and the integration of the S.D.F. into the new Syrian government, the future of Kurdistan as an independent state has rarely been dimmer. But on the flip side, a peaceful semi-autonomous Kurdish region in Syria is at least imaginable. Kurdistan may not be in the cards for the next decade or two, but perhaps everyday Kurdish people have a chance to reap at least some of the benefits of autonomy, even if it seems unlikely to be the full thing.